

- (IV) The above ordered period of ineligibility is effective from the date the Covered Person was provisionally suspended, being 8 January 2024. The period of ineligibility shall end on 7 January 2028.
- (V) Under Section H.1.a.(i) a fine of 5,000 EUR is payable in quarterly instalments of 500 EUR.
- (VI) This Decision shall be publicly reported in full as prescribed in Section G.4.e.
- (VII) Under Section G.4.d, this Decision is a “full, final and complete disposition of the matter and will be binding on all parties.”
- (VIII) The Decision herein is appealable under Section I.1. of the 2021 TACP to the Court of Arbitration for Sport (“CAS”) in Lausanne, Switzerland.
- (IX) Under Section I.4 of the TACP the deadline for filing an appeal with CAS must be made within a period of “twenty business days from the date of receipt of the decision by the appealing party.

A. Parties:

- 1. The International Tennis Integrity Agency (“ITIA”) is the governing body responsible for maintaining the integrity and preventing corruption in professional tennis worldwide. It conducts investigations and enforces the Tennis Anti-Corruption Program (“TACP”).
- 2. Mr Damjan Dejanovic is a chair umpire from Bosnia and Herzegovina (sometimes referred to herein as a "Party"; also referred to as the "Covered Person" or the "Defendant"). He is a "Tournament Support Person" and "Covered Person" as defined in Sections B.39 and B.6, respectively, of the 2023 TACP. He is accused of manipulating scoring data during matches, attempting or agreeing to commit a corruption offense, and wagering on tennis events in violation of the TACP.
- 3. Ms Diana Tesic holds the appointment as the Anti-Corruption Hearing Officer (“AHO”) under the TACP.

B. Procedural History

- 4. The alleged Corruption Offenses took place in May 2023 during the ██████ Tournament in ██████ Bosnia and Herzegovina (“██████ Tournament”). Therefore, under Section K.5 of the Tennis Anti-Corruption Program (TACP), the alleged offenses are governed by the version of the TACP in the year in which they were alleged to have occurred—the 2023 TACP for the match-fixing charges and the 2022 and 2023 TACP for the betting charges. The procedural aspects are governed by the 2024 TACP.
- 5. On 21 May 2024, the ITIA sent Mr Damjan Dejanovic a Notice of Major Offense (the "Notice"). The Notice charged Mr Dejanovic with six breaches of the TACP, comprising:
 - a. Two alleged breaches of Section D.1.m.i of the 2023 TACP: "No Covered Person shall purposely delay or manipulate entry of score(s) or scoring data from any

Event for any reason."

- b. Two alleged breaches of Section D.1.n of the 2023 TACP: "No Covered Person shall, directly or indirectly, attempt, agree, or conspire to commit any Corruption Offense."
 - c. One alleged breach of Section D.1.a of the 2022 TACP: "No Covered Person shall, directly or indirectly, wager on the outcome or any other aspect of any Event or any other tennis competition."
 - d. One alleged breach of Section D.1.a of the 2023 TACP: Same as above, applicable for events in 2023.
6. The Covered Person responded within the deadline pursuant to Section G.1.b of the 2024 TACP and requested a hearing.
 7. Under Section G.1.g of the 2024 TACP, the AHO, Ms Diana Tesic, convened a conference call with the parties on 25 June 2024. Present on the call were: Ms Diana Tesic (AHO), Mr Damjan Dejanovic (Covered Person), Ms Hannah Kent (Counsel for the ITIA).
 8. As a result, Procedural Order No. 1 ("PO No. 1") was issued by the AHO on 26 June 2024, outlining the procedural directions for the case, including deadlines for submissions, production of documents, and hearing procedures. The Procedural Order is supplementary to the arbitration process under the TACP.
 9. On 9 July 2024, the ITIA made full and complete production of the documents and other information upon which it intends to rely during the hearing, in compliance with the date set in PO No. 1.
 10. On 9 August 2024, the ITIA filed its brief and exhibits.
 11. The Covered Person filed his written submissions on 10 September 2024, within the deadline set by the AHO.
 12. The ITIA filed a reply brief on 17 September 2024, responding to new issues raised in the Covered Person's submissions.
 13. On 4 October 2024 the ITIA Secretariat informed the AHO that Mr Dejanovic would not be attending the hearing. That same day the AHO requested that the Parties provide submissions on whether the hearing should continue as scheduled.
 14. The ITIA responded on the 7 October 2024 that it wished to proceed. Mr Dejanovic responded that he would not be available.
 15. The AHO requested the ITIA to comment as to whether they would be opposed to the AHO contacting Mr Dejanovic directly by phone to ascertain his commitment to the hearing process, to which the ITIA agreed. Following a brief conversation with the AHO, Mr Dejanovic agreed to avail himself for one hour during the hearing.
 16. A hearing was held virtually via video conference on 9 October 2024. In attendance at

the hearing were:

AHO: Ms Diana Tesic
For the ITIA: Ms Hannah Kent (Counsel)
Ms Jodie Cox (ITIA internal Counsel)
Witnesses: Mr Denys Gee (ITIA Investigator),
Mr Mark Swarbrick (ITIA Betting Liaison Officer)
Covered Person: Mr Damjan Dejanovic (Self-represented)
ITIA Secretariat: Mr Ben Rutherford

C. Background Facts

17. On 21 May 2024, the ITIA issued a Notice of Major Offense to Mr Damjan Dejanovic, a National Level Chair Umpire from Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Notice charged Mr Dejanovic with one breach of the 2022 TACP and 5 breaches of the 2023 TACP related to 3 separate Charges, specifically:
 - a. Charge 1: Violation of Section D.1.m.i – manipulating the scoring data by purposely delaying or manipulating the entry of scores from an event for betting purposes;
 - b. Charge 2: Violation of Section D.1.n – directly or indirectly attempting, agreeing, or conspiring to commit any Corruption Offense; and
 - c. Charge 3: Violation of Section D.1.a – betting on the outcome or any other aspect of an event.
18. Charges 1 and 2 arose from incidents occurring during two matches officiated by Mr Dejanovic at the [REDACTED] Tournament. The matches in question were:
 - a. Match 1: [REDACTED] match between [REDACTED] [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] [REDACTED] on [REDACTED] May 2023.
 - b. Match 2: [REDACTED] match involving [REDACTED] [REDACTED] vs. [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] on [REDACTED] May 2023.
19. Charge 3 was discovered during the ITIA's investigation into the other alleged corruption offenses (Charges 1 and 2).
20. The ITIA's investigation was prompted by alerts from the International Betting Integrity Association ("IBIA") and various betting operators regarding suspicious betting patterns on specific games within the matches officiated by Mr Dejanovic. The suspicious activity involved unusually high betting volumes on obscure markets, namely specific games reaching deuce.
21. Analysis of the point-by-point data from the matches revealed discrepancies between the scores entered into the Personal Digital Assistant ("PDA") device used by Mr Dejanovic and the actual scores announced audibly during the matches. Specifically, additional points were recorded in the PDA that did not correspond with the play observed in the audio recordings. This resulted in a number of highly unusual bets placed through several different betting platforms located in Greece, Romania, Serbia and Brazil.

22. On 2 March 2023, ITIA investigator Mr Denys Gee conducted an interview with Mr Dejanovic. During the interview Mr Dejanovic acknowledged placing small bets on tennis matches from 2022 to 2023 but asserted that these were minor, infrequent, and not on matches he officiated. This admission directly indicated a breach of Section D.1.a of the TACP, which prohibits all Covered Persons from betting on any aspect of any tennis event.
23. Mr Dejanovic denied Charges 1 and 2, but accepted Charge 3 outlined in the Notice and requested a hearing.

D. The Applicable Law and Jurisdiction

24. It is undisputed that the applicable rules are TACP 2022 and 2023 with regards to the alleged Major Offences and the TACP 2024 with regards to the procedure.
25. No party has objected to the appointment of the AHO, undersigned, to hear this matter. She has been properly appointed and seized of the matters in dispute.
26. No other matters relating to jurisdiction or the arbitrability of these matters have been raised by any party.

E. Position of the Parties

27. The AHO has thoroughly reviewed all the evidence, the written and oral submissions from both parties. Below is a summary of the key contentions presented by the parties. Any evidence or submissions not explicitly mentioned are still considered in the AHO's overall analysis

1. The ITIA

28. On 9 August 2024 the ITIA filed its brief. The ITIA alleged that Mr Dejanovic manipulated the scoring data by purposely delaying or manipulating the entry of scores from a match on ■ May 2023 for betting purposes (Charge 1). They allege that he further directly or indirectly attempted, agreed, or conspired to commit any Corruption Offense related to the manipulation in Charge 1 and another match on ■ May 2023. The ITIA's case is based on evidence of score manipulation to facilitate betting activities and finally Mr Dejanovic's admission of betting on tennis events in relation to Charge 3.
29. The ITIA's case is built on several categories of evidence, including audio recordings, point-by-point data, betting patterns, expert testimony, and admissions by the respondent.
30. The ITIA submit that during the two matches, Mr Dejanovic deliberately manipulated the entry of scores into the PDA used by chair umpires, resulting in discrepancies between the actual scores called on court and those entered into the PDA. As a result, unknown individuals placed bets on specific outcomes that were guaranteed by the manipulated scores, suggesting coordination between the bettors and the respondent. The

methodology mirrors previous cases where chair umpires manipulated scoring data to influence betting outcomes, involving high degrees of planning and coordination.

31. The respondent admitted to placing bets on tennis matches, contrary to the explicit prohibitions of the TACP.
32. The ITIA submitted that The ITIA's investigation, led by Mr Denys Gee, identified significant discrepancies between the scores called audibly by the respondent and those entered into the PDA during the matches in question. The point-by-point data revealed unrealistically short intervals between points, inconsistent with the standard pace of play and at with certain points would not accurately correspond to the 25-second allowance between points in professional tennis.
33. Further, despite being trained to use the PDA's "undo" function to correct mistakes, the respondent did not rectify the discrepancies, instead adding points to arrive at the actual live result, suggesting intentional manipulation rather than inadvertent errors.
34. In terms of the specific charges the ITIA submitted as follows:

Charge 1: Match 1 on ■ May 2023

35. During the ■ match between ■ and ■ on ■ May 2023 in ■ Bosnia and Herzegovina, suspicious betting patterns were reported on the ■ game of the ■ set, specifically bets on the game to ■.
36. Discrepancies were found between the audio recordings of the match and the scores entered into the PDA by Mr Dejanovic. Namely that there were instances where points were entered into the PDA before they occurred or without corresponding play, resulting in additional points that took the game to deuce.

PBP Data Entry (AN-AA)	Match Time Elapsed (PBP Data)	Corresponding Audio Time	Score Called on Audio Recording
Ball in play	00:21:34	00:29:13	
██████	00:22:03	00:29:43	"██████"
Ball in play	00:22:29	00:30:09	
██████	00:22:33	00:30:12	"Out" called at 00:30:10, followed by "██████"
Ball in play	00:22:44	00:30:23	
██████	00:22:54	00:30:33	"Out" called at 00:30:32, followed by "██████"
Ball in play	00:23:12	00:30:51	
██████	00:23:49	00:31:29	"Out" called at 00:31:26, followed by "██████" at 00:31:32
Ball in play	00:24:11	00:31:50	
Service Fault ██████	00:24:12	00:31:52	No corresponding audio
Ball in play	00:24:27	00:32:06	
██████	00:24:33	00:32:08	"Let, second serve" called at 00:32:08
		00:32:12	
		00:32:16	"Fault" called at 00:32:16
Ball in play	00:24:40	00:32:19	
		00:32:22	"██████" called at 00:32:22
██████	00:24:49	00:32:29	No corresponding audio and no sounds of tennis being played
		00:32:37	"Fault" called at 00:32:37
Ball in play	00:25:02	00:32:42	
		00:32:45	"Out" called at 00:32:45
Advantage ██████	00:25:08	00:32:47	No corresponding audio
		00:32:48	██████ called for ██████ at 00:32:48
		00:32:52	Score called as "██████" at 00:32:52
Ball in play	00:25:14	00:32:53	No corresponding audio
Game ██████	00:25:16	00:32:55	No corresponding audio

37. On Game █ of Set █ at █████ of the Match Play, Mr Dejanovic audibly called the score as "██████" but entered "██████" into the PDA. Additional points ("██████," "██████" "Advantage," "Game") were entered into the PDA without corresponding play or audio calls. Lastly, The PDA recorded eight points, whereas the audio indicated only █ points were played.

38. Alerts from the IBIA and betting operators highlighted unusual betting patterns on the specific game. Multiple bettors placed bets on Game █ of Set █ reaching █████ an obscure market, despite no prior games reaching █████ and no rational basis for such bets. Bets were placed by multiple accounts across different operators (██████)

██████████ ██████████ from different countries (Brazil, Greece, Serbia, Romania). According to the IBIA report, the timing of the bets corresponded with the manipulated scoring data.

39. The ITIA submitted that in relation to Charge 1, given the discrepancies between the audio and PDA data, coupled with the suspicious betting patterns, it demonstrates that the respondent intentionally manipulated the scoring data to facilitate betting fraud, violating Section D.1.m.i and D.1.n of the 2023 TACP.

Charge 2: Match 2 on █████ May 2023

40. During the █████ match involving █████ ██████████ vs. ██████████ on █████ May 2023 in █████ Bosnia and Herzegovina, suspicious betting patterns were reported by the IBIA on the █████ game of the █████ set, with bets on the game to reach █████

41. Similar discrepancies were found between the audio recordings and PDA entries as in Charge 1. Additional points were entered without corresponding play, taking the game to █████ The PDA recorded seven points in the game, while the audio indicated only █████ points were actually played.

PBP Data Entry (KN / AR)	Match Time Elapsed (PBP Data)	Corresponding Audio Time	Score Called on Audio Recording
Ball in play	00:08:06	0:21:38	
Service Fault █████ ██████████	00:08:08	0:21:40	No corresponding audio
Ball in play	00:08:14	0:21:46	
██████████	00:08:18	0:21:50	“Out”, followed by some non-English language and “██████████”
Ball in play	00:08:38	0:22:10	
██████████	00:08:46	0:22:18	“Out”, followed by some non-English language and “██████████”
Ball in play	00:09:02	0:22:34	
Service Fault █████ ██████████	00:09:05	0:22:37	“Fault”
Ball in play	00:09:11	0:22:43	
██████████	00:09:14	0:22:46	“██████████”
Ball in play	00:09:34	0:23:06	

██████████	00:09:42	0:23:14	██████████ said quietly at 0:23:16. Sounds of tennis continue in the background
Ball in play	00:09:54	0:23:26	
██████████	00:10:00	0:23:32	
		0:23:38	“Out” called loudly at 00:23:38, followed by “██████████” at 00:23:46
Ball in play	00:10:19	0:23:50	
██████████	00:10:34	0:24:06	No corresponding audio
		0:██████████	“Game” called a ██████████, awarding the game to ██████████. The score is called as “█████ games ██████”
Ball in play	00:10:47	0:24:19	
Game	00:10:51	0:24:23	No corresponding audio

42. On Game █ of Set █ at 24:06 of the Audio Time, Mr Dejanovic did not audibly call out the score as "██████████" but entered "██████████" into the PDA. Then at ██████████ of the Audio Time called “Game”, while the PDA data shows one more point being played. The ITIA submits that the 13 seconds between the ██████████ being entered into the PDA and the start of the final point, which lasted 4 seconds, is too short of a time period for the tennis players to complete all the steps required for the point. Lastly, the PDA recorded █ points, whereas the audio indicated only █ points were played.
43. Similar to Charge 1, bets were placed on obscure markets, with accounts from various countries. Likewise, patterns of coordinated betting were observed, with some accounts overlapping with those from Charge 1. Bets on Game █ of Set █ reaching ██████████ accounted for over 90% of the total betting turnover for the match on ██████████
44. On the day of Match 2, Mr Dejanovic received a message from "██████████" (translation from Serbian meaning ██████████ which stated: "Reduce stress and nervousness. Don't let him notice your nervousness and suspect something. Good Luck." The ITIA argued that while there is no direct correlation, that the timing of the message and its contents is suspicious.
45. The ITIA submitted that in relation to Charge 2, given the discrepancies between the audio and PDA data, coupled with the suspicious betting patterns, the text message from "██████████" it demonstrates that the respondent intentionally manipulated the scoring data to facilitate betting fraud, violating Section D.1.m.i and D.1.n of the 2023 TACP.

Charge 3: Mr Dejanovic Betting on Professional Tennis

46. During the interview with ITIA investigator **Mr Denys Gee**, and in his written and oral submissions, Mr Dejanovic admitted to placing bets on tennis matches. The ITIA discovered at least 238 bets since 2022 which were placed by Mr Dejanovic in breach of the TACP. The ITIA submitted that it is clear that Mr Dejanovic breached D.1.a of the TACP in both 2022 and 2023.

Expert Evidence

47. The AHO received extensive expert evidence, both written and oral, from Mr Denys Gee, an investigator with the ITIA, and Mr Mark Swarbrick, a betting liaison officer at the ITIA with many years of experience in the sports betting industry, particularly in tennis. A statement was also provided by ██████████ a gold badge umpire with over 20 years of experience. Summaries of the evidence presented by Mr Swarbrick and Mr Gee are set out below. While the AHO has considered ██████████ statement in her deliberations, given that it pertains more generally to umpire education and the use of the PDA, it has been omitted from the detailed summaries that follow.

Mr Mark Swarbrick

48. Mr Mark Swarbrick is the Betting Liaison Officer for the International Tennis Integrity Agency (ITIA), with over 35 years of experience in the betting industry, particularly in tennis betting markets. He provided both written and oral testimony during the proceedings against Mr Damjan Dejanovic. His expertise lies in identifying suspicious betting patterns and interpreting betting data to detect potential match-fixing activities.

49. Mr Swarbrick's evidence looked at markers of suspicious betting patterns and indicators of coordination and collusion which includes *inter alia*:

- a. **Unusual Betting on Obscure Markets:** Mr Swarbrick highlighted that the bets placed were on specific games reaching ██████████. This is a niche market that accounts for less than 0.25% of all tennis bets. Such markets are rarely targeted by bettors, especially in low-level matches.
- b. **High Volume of Bets on Specific Outcomes:** Multiple bettors placed significant volume of bets on the same specific outcome (games reaching ██████████) in the same games of matches officiated by Mr Dejanovic. This level of focused betting on an obscure market is highly unusual.
- c. **Timing of Bets:** The bets were often placed in advance of the beginning of the relevant game and were placed within seconds of each other by different accounts across various betting operators. This simultaneous betting suggests coordination among bettors.
- d. **Multiple Bets from Different Jurisdictions:** Bets originated from accounts registered in different countries (Brazil, Greece, Serbia, Romania), yet all targeted the same obscure market in low-level matches. This cross-jurisdictional betting pattern is atypical and indicative of organized activity.
- e. **Overlap of Betting Accounts:** Some betting accounts were involved in betting on both matches under investigation, further indicating a coordinated effort.
- f. **Lack of Betting Rationale:** There was no logical reason based on the match progression or players' performance to justify the betting patterns observed. At the time of the bets, the match score for Match 1 did not suggest any reason to bet on the ██████████ game reaching ██████████. Neither player had previous games going to ██████████ and one player was leading ██████████. Likewise there was no legitimate reason to expect the ██████████ game to go to ██████████ in match ██████████.

- g. **Astronomical Odds Against Random Occurrence:** During the hearing Mr Swarbrick stated that seeing multiple bettors place identical bets on an obscure market in low-level matches is astronomically improbable. The likelihood of such coordinated betting patterns occurring naturally is extremely low, reinforcing the conclusion of deliberate collusion.
 - h. **Multiple Red Flags Present:** The betting patterns exhibited several red flags, including new betting accounts, high stakes on obscure markets, simultaneous bets from different jurisdictions, and overlapping bettors across matches.
 - i. **Consistency with Known Match-Fixing Techniques:** The use of specific markets like games reaching deuce is consistent with methods used in previous match-fixing cases.
 - j. **Emphasis on Low-Level Matches:** During his oral testimony, Mr Swarbrick stressed that low-level matches like those in question do not typically attract significant betting interest, especially on niche markets. Bettors would have to actively seek out these matches, indicating deliberate intent.
50. Mr Swarbrick accepts that there could be rational explanations for each of these suspicious events and does not go so far as to say that the presence of one or two factors is definitively indicative of a match being fixed, however, each component is indicative of unusual betting behaviour. The more components that are present then moves the behaviour away from unusual and more towards suspicious. The effect is cumulative and where betting contains several components, in his view, this is highly indicative of a potential fix.
51. Given the improbability of the betting patterns occurring naturally and the discrepancies in scoring data, Mr Swarbrick concluded that it is highly likely that the umpire, Mr Dejanovic, was involved in manipulating the matches. The specificity and coordination of the bets suggest that bettors had prior knowledge of the manipulation, pointing to collusion with the umpire.
52. In terms of winnings, the betting data showed for Match 1 the total value of bets placed as EUR 65.24, from which the bettors won EUR 208.67. For Match 2, the total value of winning bets amounted to nearly EUR 2,500.

Mr Denys Gee

53. Mr Denys Gee is an investigator with the ITIA. Mr Gee led the investigation into the alleged breaches of the TACP by Mr Damjan Dejanovic. Mr Gee explained that the ITIA's attention was drawn to Mr Dejanovic following receipt of betting alerts received from the IBIA on [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] May 2023 concerning matches officiated by Mr Dejanovic during the [REDACTED] Tournament. He also conducted an interview with Mr Dejanovic on 20 November 2023, during which the respondent was accompanied by an interpreter.
54. In his statement he stated *inter alia* that:
- a. The chair umpire is the required to accurately record match scores using a

handheld electronic scoring device (PDA), since live scoring data is directly transmitted from it to the ITF, betting operators, and other stakeholders. Since 2018, PDAs also record audio, capturing the umpire's verbal score announcements and ambient sounds during the match. Chair umpires receive specific training on the use of PDAs, and they are expected to ensure that the scores entered into the PDA match the scores called out audibly on court.

- b. Mr Gee obtained and analyzed the audio recordings from the PDAs, point-by-point data detailing the scores entered into the PDAs, betting data provided by betting operators, and communications extracted from the respondent's mobile phone.
- c. He found significant discrepancies between the audio recordings and the point-by-point data in the games that were the subject of the betting alerts. Specifically, in both matches, the number of points entered into the PDA exceeded the number of points actually played and called out on court, resulting in games that appeared to reach deuce according to the PDA data but did not do so in reality.
- d. In the match on ■ May 2023 (Charge 1), during the ■ game of the ■ set, the audio recording indicated that only ■ points were played, with the respondent audibly calling the score as "■" after the ■ point. However, the PDA showed that the score was entered as "■" at that juncture. Subsequently, additional points of "■" "■" "Advantage," and "Game" were entered into the PDA without corresponding audible calls or play on court. Mr Gee notes that the final point was entered into the PDA only eight seconds after the previous point, an unrealistically short interval for professional tennis.
- e. Similarly, in the match on ■ May 2023 (Charge 2), during the ■ game of the ■ set, the PDA recorded ■ points, whereas the audio recording indicated only six points were played. The score of "■" was entered into the PDA without any corresponding audible call or evidence of play. Additionally, the score of "■" was entered into the PDA six seconds before the respondent called "Out" on court, suggesting that the score was predetermined irrespective of the actual play.
- f. Mr Gee stated that such discrepancies cannot be attributed to simple errors or mistakes. Chair umpires are trained to use the PDA's "undo" function to correct any mistakes in score entry, and there is no evidence that the respondent attempted to correct any alleged errors. Furthermore, players would typically challenge incorrect scores called out during a match, but no such challenges are evident in the audio recordings.
- g. The intervals between points during the suspicious games were unrealistically short, inconsistent with the 25 seconds allowed between points under the ITF Rules of Tennis and which athletes normally exhaust.
- h. During Mr Dejanovic's interview, when confronted with the discrepancies and the suspicious betting activity, he denied any wrongdoing. He suggested that any errors in score entry might have been due to mistakes caused by nervousness or personal distractions, stating that his "thoughts were somewhere else." He also stated this was the first time he had used a PDA in the 20-30 tennis matches he

umpired.

- i. Mr Gee noted that the respondent did not report any issues with the PDA to the tournament supervisor, and no such issues were reported by the supervisor when contacted.
 - j. A forensic examination of the respondent's mobile phone uncovered a text message received on the morning of [REDACTED] May 2023 from a contact saved as [REDACTED] (meaning [REDACTED] in the respondent's language). The message stated: "Reduce stress and nervousness and just be smart. Don't let him notice your nervousness and suspect something. Good luck." Mr Gee considers this message to be suspicious, suggesting awareness of illicit activities and concern about being detected.
 - k. Mr Gee also questioned Mr Dejanovic on his betting activities. Initially, the respondent denied betting on tennis but later admitted during the interview that he had placed bets on tennis matches, including ATP and WTA events, while being a Covered Person under the TACP. The respondent provided login details for several betting accounts. The ITIA's analysis revealed that between 1 April 2022 and 9 November 2023, the respondent placed bets on at least 238 tennis matches. Communications extracted from his mobile phone also indicated attempts to open betting accounts using another individual's details, which the person refused.
55. On the basis of the evidence set out by the expert witnesses and its written and oral submissions, the ITIA submits that based on the preponderance of the evidence, Mr Dejanovic was involved in a scheme to manipulate match scores for financial gain, and should be found liable of violating of Sections D.1.m.i, D.1.n, and D.1.a of the TACP.

Sanction

56. As to the Sanction, the ITIA submitted in line with the Sanctioning Guidelines ('the Guidelines'), the Charges against Mr Dejanovic should be categorised as B-1. The ITIA notes that when applying the Guidelines, the AHO "retains full discretion in relation to the sanctions to be imposed in accordance with the TACP and may apply or depart from the guidelines in accordance with the circumstances of the case."
57. The ITIA proposes that a reasonable and appropriate sanction for Mr Dejanovic is a ban ranging from five to seven years and a fine between \$10,000 and \$15,000.
58. Regarding the category of offense, the ITIA submits that the culpability level for Mr Dejanovic falls primarily within Category B, with factors including:
- a. High degree of planning and premeditation (Category A): The manipulation of match scores required significant planning and coordination with third parties, as detailed in Mr Gee's witness statement. The degree of planning is plainly high given the need for Mr Dejanovic to agree with a third party as to which points of which games the relevant bets will be placed on and what Mr Dejanovic must do on court to ensure that is successful. The element of planning is particularly acute

- given Mr Dejanovic must simultaneously audibly call out the correct score on court.
- b. Acting in concert with others (Category B): While there is no evidence that the respondent initiated or led others to commit offenses (as per Category A), he clearly worked with third parties to carry out the offenses.
 - c. Several offenses (Category B): Mr Dejanovic committed multiple match-fixing offenses during a single tournament in May 2023, which constitutes several offenses rather than a single isolated incident.
59. In terms of impact, the ITIA asserts that the respondent's actions primarily fall within Category 1:
- a. Major TACP offenses (Category 1): Both the manipulation of scoring data (Section D.1.m.i) and conspiracy to commit a corruption offense (Section D.1.n) are considered major offenses under the TACP.
 - b. Significant material impact on the reputation and integrity of the sport (Category 1): The respondent's actions undermine public confidence in the integrity of tennis, especially given his role as a chair umpire, a position of trust and responsibility.
 - c. Holding a position of trust/responsibility within the sport (Category 1): As a chair umpire, the respondent was expected to uphold the highest standards of integrity, which he breached through his actions.
 - d. Material gain (Category 2): While the exact amount of illicit gain is unknown, it is reasonable to infer that the respondent received material gain from his involvement in the scheme.
60. Based on the above factors, the ITIA submits that the appropriate categorization of the respondent's conduct is B1, albeit on the lower side given some elements fall within Category 2.
61. For the starting point and range of the sanction, the Guidelines suggest a ten-year ban for offenses categorized as B1. However, the ITIA proposes a ban of five to seven years, backdated to commence from the date of the respondent's provisional suspension on 8 January 2024.
62. The ITIA contends that there are no mitigating factors applicable in this case. Mr Dejanovic has not made any admissions, offered an apology, or shown remorse for his actions.
63. There are also no grounds for a reduction in the sanction under Steps 3 and 4 of the Guidelines, as the respondent has not provided substantial assistance or made early admissions.
64. Regarding the fine, the Guidelines provide broad discretion. Considering the number and nature of the offenses, the ITIA suggests a fine in the range of \$10,000 to \$15,000 is appropriate, without any portion being suspended. This aligns with the Fines Table in the Guidelines for offenses of this categorization.
65. With respect to Charge 3, involving betting on tennis matches (a violation of Section

D.1.a), the ITIA does not consider this a Major TACP Offense. The maximum sanction for this offense is a ban of six months and a fine of \$10,000. Given the scale of the respondent's betting activity, the ITIA believes that any sanction for this offense should be encompassed within the overall sanction proposed for the other charges.

2. The Covered Person

66. The entirety Mr Dejanovic's written submissions are reproduced below:

"First of all, I will start from the fact that I have no connections, connections and the like with the mentioned betting accounts from Greece, Brazil, Croatia and the like... Until now, I did not even know that the mentioned [REDACTED] and other betting companies existed.

Regarding the tournament in [REDACTED] I want to say that it was a difficult period for me in my life in general for several reasons. In May of last year, I came to [REDACTED] for an annual vacation for 7 days from Germany, where I was working at the time. I came because I had a trial at which I was a witness and at which I was obliged to be. At that time, tennis was on the back burner, although I hoped that I would be able to build a career as a judge. However, I was lucky that there was a tournament in [REDACTED] at that time and that I would be able to referee at least one tournament that year and receive an evaluation that would help me further my career and apply for the white badge. At that time, [REDACTED] [REDACTED] both on the tennis courts and in my neighborhood, a very difficult situation for everyone, but I still decided to referee the tournament despite that. Anxiety and other problems and insecurity took their toll and I made some mistakes. Otherwise, it didn't happen to me before and I judged at a good level. Also, [REDACTED] made me even more upset and I couldn't wait to go back to work in Germany, which happened 7 days later.

As for [REDACTED] messages, they were all with the best intentions and for my own good, to encourage me because he knew how much tennis refereeing meant to me and how much I wanted it, and he also knew the whole situation regarding the floods, the trial as a witness, [REDACTED] and my anxiety. [REDACTED] has never played any ticket in his life nor does he have any idea how a betting shop works or bet or know anything about it.

As for the messages with my company that were delivered there about "opening betting accounts" and the like, that was all before I even started judging, that also has nothing to do with anything here. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, there are various promotions on betting websites during registration and free "Freebets" and other prizes during the registration itself, I used to take those "Freebets" and prizes that were worth only 5e or 10e with the company. If I'm not mistaken, it was 2020 or 2021 and we made orders to friends from high school from BiH, so it has absolutely nothing to do with anything..

Let me also refer to my betting accounts and playing tickets. I did play tickets, as I showed you that you have a record. As I have shown you, I have never but never bet on any tournament in my life that I have refereed, and you could very well have checked that yourself as well as the "exact number of bets" you checked (230+). So I never bet on the tournaments I refereed, regardless of whether I was a chair referee or a linesman.

With all due respect, I also want to say that the penalty you are requesting is too high and that I do not fully agree with it, especially the monetary part of the penalty, too harsh and unrealistic. I continue to work on training and do not receive full wages at all, which are quite small. Your

request is too strict and I do not agree with it at all. Unfortunately, I accept the suspension because I am aware that I bet and I shouldn't have, and I am very sorry, I regret it, because as I have already stated, I had the ambition to become a top tennis referee. In the attachment, I will also leave the determination of the photo as evidence for some of the things I wrote. To repeat once again, I have nothing to do with any order and any bet you submitted in your photos, I do not know any of those people's names, I do not know those bookmakers, I did not receive any benefit or money as you stated in the witness statements. After all, millions of people in the world gamble today, some win, most people lose, and they play various bets."

67. In summary, Mr Dejanovic denies all the Charges brought against him with the exception of the wagering charge, conceding that he did make bets on tennis matches from his account in breach of the TACP and accepting full responsibility for the same.
68. With respect to sanction, Mr Dejanovic has stated that *"the penalty you are requesting is too high and that I do not fully agree with it, especially the monetary part of the penalty, too harsh and unrealistic."* He also requested during the hearing that the decision not be made public.

F. Applicable Provisions of the 2023 TACP

69. Sections H.1.a and H.1.b of the 2023 TACP read as follows:

***H.1** "Except as provided in Sections F.5 and F.6, the penalty for any Corruption Offense shall be determined by the AHO in accordance with the procedures set forth in Section G, and may include:*

***H.1.a.** With respect to any Player, (i) a fine of up to \$250,000 plus an amount equal to the value of any winnings or other amounts received by such Covered Person in connection with any Corruption Offense; (ii) ineligibility from Participation in any Sanctioned Events for a period of up to three years unless permitted under Section H.1.c; and (iii) with respect to any violation of Section D.1, clauses (c) – (p), Section D.2 and Section F, ineligibility from Participation in any Sanctioned Events for a maximum period of permanent ineligibility unless permitted under Section H.1.c.*

***H.1.b.** With respect to any Related Person or Tournament Support Person, (i) a fine of up to \$250,000 plus an amount equal to the value of any winnings or other amounts received by such Covered Person in connection with any Corruption Offense; (ii) ineligibility from Participation in any Sanctioned Events for a period of up to three years, and (iii) with respect to any violation of Section D.1, clauses (c) – (p), Section D.2 and Section F, ineligibility from Participation in any Sanctioned Events for a maximum period of permanent ineligibility.³*

G. Admissibility of Evidence and Burden of Proof

70. Section G.3.d. of the TACP 2024 states, "[...] A Corruption Offense may be established by any reliable means, as determined in the sole discretion of the AHO."

71. The admissibility of evidence was discussed by CAS in the case of *Khalil, Mesbahi & Kilani v. ITIA* ('the Khalil Award'). The CAS Panel found Section G.3.c. of the TACP to be consistent with international arbitration standards, which state that "[...] *the arbitral tribunal is not bound to follow the rules applicable to the taking of evidence before the courts of the seat.*"
72. The Panel in the Khalil Award also noted that the CAS Code does not contain specific provisions regarding the assessment of evidence in CAS proceedings or, by analogy, in AHO evaluations and decisions. It was noted that the principle of free evaluation of evidence ("*libre appréciation des preuves*") is applicable in international arbitration in general and to CAS proceedings in particular. Furthermore, Section G.3.d. of the TACP applies a similar rule, stating that "[...] A Corruption Offense may be established by any reliable means, as determined in the sole discretion of the AHO." Therefore, in the present proceedings, the AHO may evaluate the evidence on record at her discretion. The Panel also distinguished between direct and circumstantial evidence, stating that "*Direct evidence is evidence that, if believed, directly proves a fact. Circumstantial evidence differs as it requires a trier of fact to draw an inference to connect it with a conclusion of fact.*"
73. Section G.3.a of the TACP 2024 provides that the ITIA must prove the charges by a preponderance of the evidence as follows: "*The ITIA (which may be represented by legal counsel at the Hearing) shall have the burden of establishing that a Corruption Offense has been committed. The standard of proof shall be whether the ITIA has established the commission of the alleged Corruption Offense by a preponderance of the evidence.*"
74. The standard of preponderance of evidence is met if "*the proposition that the Player engaged in attempted match-fixing is more likely than not to be true.*" This standard is equivalent to the English law standard of proof on the "balance of probabilities." The AHO has applied this standard of proof to the Charges.
75. While it is possible to find a breach of the TACP without direct evidence, the circumstantial evidence must still meet the standard of the preponderance of the evidence as required by Section G.3.a. of the TACP 2024.
76. In evaluating the evidence for this case, the AHO has relied on the aforementioned principles. Applying these principles to circumstantial evidence, the AHO has drawn various conclusions based on inferences from the circumstances. Sometimes, the evidence's weight allows for a logical or reasonable inference, similar to a finding of fact, even without direct evidence. In other cases, a logical deduction from the reliability or sufficiency of the evidence permits the inferred finding that a Corruption Offense has occurred. In all instances, the AHO's conclusion meets the preponderance of the evidence standard, indicating that it is more likely than not to be true.
77. There is no proof of any direct communication between Mr Dejanovic and any third party coordinating the bets regarding the alleged Corruption Offenses. Additionally, there is no direct evidence or material proof that Mr Dejanovic received any payment. Therefore, in consideration of the above, the AHO will apply the foregoing principles when evaluating the evidence.

H. Decision

78. The AHO has carefully considered all the evidence presented in this matter, including the expert witness statements of Mr Denys Gee and Mr Mark Swarbrick on behalf of the ITIA, as well as the submissions made by Mr Damjan Dejanovic. The AHO has also taken into account the oral arguments presented during the hearing and the cross-examination of the respondent.
79. As a preliminary matter, during the hearing, Mr Dejanovic raised, for the first time, the possibility that the audio recordings of the matches might have been manipulated using artificial intelligence ("AI"). He suggested that the recordings could have been altered to misrepresent the actual events on court. However, Mr Dejanovic did not raise this concern during the investigation, nor did he provide any evidence to support this allegation. In fact, during his interview with the ITIA, he confirmed that the voice on the recordings was his own. There is no indication or evidence of any tampering or manipulation of these recordings. Given the absence of any substantive proof to the contrary, the AHO accepts the audio recordings as authentic and accurate. The AHO finds that the recordings are reliable evidence of what transpired during the matches and must be accepted as correct.

Charge 1: Match 1 on ■ May 2023

80. Charge 1 relates to a ■ match played on ■ May 2023 between ■ and ■. Suspicious betting patterns were reported on the ■ game of the ■ set.
81. During the hearing Mr Dejanovic was briefly cross examined by the ITIA about specific instances where he entered incorrect scores into the PDA that did not correspond to the play on court with respect to the ■ game:
- a. He acknowledged that only ■ points were played in the game in question.
 - b. He admitted entering the score of "15-30" into the PDA while calling out "30-15" on court, suggesting it was a mistake.
 - c. When confronted with entering "30-40" into the PDA before the point was played, he stated it could have been an accidental touch, emphasizing that mistakes can happen to anyone.
 - d. Regarding entering "Deuce" into the PDA without it being played or called, he again attributed it to human error, stating it was unintentional.
 - e. He acknowledged that after the game had concluded on court, he entered an additional point ("Advantage ■" into the PDA, explaining that it was easier for him to click one point to correct the mistake rather than undo multiple points.
82. Mr Dejanovic emphasized that these were honest mistakes, possibly due to the small size of the device and accidental touches, and that making errors is human and happens in all sports.
83. The AHO acknowledges that human errors can occur. However she is not compelled by Mr Dejanovic's arguments that these discrepancies were in fact mistakes. Mr Dejanovic entered scores into the PDA that not only differed from the audible calls but also included points that were not actually played on court.

84. Specifically, the entry of "30-40" into the PDA which was called 10 seconds after the point was entered into the PDA, as well as the entry of "Deuce" "Advantage" and "Game" without any corresponding play or audible call. One wrongly inputted point may be considered an error, however multiple wrong entries is inconsistent with accidental errors. These inputs occurred precisely in the game that was the subject of suspicious betting activity, suggesting a pattern rather than isolated mistakes.
85. The AHO is not convinced by Mr Dejanovic's assertion that it was easier to click one point rather than use the "undo" function. The AHO accepts that chair umpires are trained to use the "undo" function on the PDA to correct mistakes. In addition umpires are trained that the information inputted into the PDA is directly linked with betting markets. Therefore Mr Dejanovic knew or ought to have known that by inputting the incorrect score the betting markets would be directly affected. Since the betting markets would have had the wrong information, it would be imperative for the umpire to make use of the "undo" function especially where the umpire has made an accidental mistake to halt any betting on that specific point. The AHO also notes that the respondent did not report any issues with the PDA to the tournament supervisor.
86. Mr Swarbrick's testimony highlighted that betting on a game reaching deuce is exceptionally rare, accounting for only about 0.25% of all tennis bets. Furthermore, bettors typically focus on higher-profile matches with greater visibility; therefore, in Match 1 for multiple bettors across different jurisdictions (Serbia, Romania, Greece and Brazil) to coordinate wagers on such an obscure market in a low-level match is highly unusual and "astronomically improbable." The matches officiated by Mr Dejanovic were at a level that would not ordinarily attract significant betting interest. Bettors would have had to deliberately seek out these specific matches and markets, which the ITIA has submitted is uncommon. The AHO is persuaded that the improbability of this chance occurrence supports the inference that Mr Dejanovic was involved in manipulating the scoring data to facilitate these bets. The convergence of manipulated scoring data with precise alignment to the suspicious betting patterns suggests that the bettors had prior knowledge of the manipulated outcomes.
87. Therefore, with respect to Charge 1, and considering the evidence of the audio recordings from the PDAs and point-by-point data detailing the scores entered into the PDAs together with the expert evidence, the AHO finds that it is more likely than not that Mr Dejanovic deliberately manipulated the scores entered into the PDA in violation of Section D.1.m.i of the TACP. The AHO finds that a reasonably strong inference can be made as a result that Mr Dejanovic facilitated betting and that he was part of a "conspiracy" to commit a match fixing offence as it is not probable that he was acting alone, in violation of Section D.1.n of the TACP.

Charge 2: Match 2 on [REDACTED] May 2023

88. The second charge relates to a [REDACTED] match on [REDACTED] May 2023 between [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]. Suspicious betting patterns were reported on the [REDACTED] game of the [REDACTED] set.
- a. The AHO finds that the evidence in Charge 2 mirrors that of Charge 1, demonstrating a pattern of deliberate manipulation. Namely that:

- b. The respondent entered "██████" into the PDA six seconds before calling "Out" on court.
 - c. "Deuce" was entered into the PDA without any corresponding audible call or evidence of play.
 - d. The audio recording indicated █████ points were played, but the PDA recorded █████ points.
 - e. The point-by-point data again showed unrealistically short intervals between points, such as only 6 seconds between "██████" and the start of the final point.
89. The AHO accepts Mr Gee's forensic evidence, supported by the expert evidence of Mr ████████ that Mr Dejanovic's incorrect score entries made with minimal time between points are unrealistic and indicative of deliberate manipulation. Specifically, in Match 2 Mr Dejanovic entered the score of "██████" into the PDA six seconds before he called "Out" on court to indicate the point had ended. Additionally, only thirteen seconds elapsed between the entry of "Deuce" and the start of the final point. In his expert written statement ██████████ stated that athletes typically utilize the full 25 seconds allowed between points to recover, collect balls, and prepare for the next serve. Therefore, the AHO finds it highly improbable that all necessary actions could occur within such brief intervals of six to thirteen seconds.
90. The ITIA submits, and the AHO agrees, that these timing discrepancies are inconsistent with standard match play. The AHO finds that when considered together, the entries into the PDA, the voice recording that does not align with the PDA inputs, and the unrealistic timing supports the conclusion that the respondent deliberately manipulated the scores on the PDA.
91. The AHO also considers the evidence of the betting activity in Match Two. Bets placed on the █████ game of the █████ set reaching deuce accounted for over 90% of the total betting turnover for the match on one operator—described by Mr Swarbrick as an extraordinarily high percentage for such an obscure market. Notably, the betting evidence indicates that in at least one instance, the same betting account was used to place wagers on both matches in question. This overlap in betting accounts allows the AHO to deduce a logical inference that there was a coordinated effort involving Mr Dejanovic and bettors who had prior knowledge of the games going to Deuce.
92. Therefore, with respect to Charge 2, when this betting activity is considered together with the discrepancies between the PDA entries and the audible score announcements, as well as the unrealistic timing between points—including the premature entry of "██████" into the PDA before the point concluded on court—the AHO is persuaded that these factors collectively indicate that it is more probable than not that Mr Dejanovic deliberately manipulated the scoring data in violation of Section D.1.m.i of the TACP. The AHO finds that a reasonably strong inference can be made as a result that Mr Dejanovic facilitated betting and that he was part of a "conspiracy" to commit a match fixing offence as it is not probable that he was acting alone, in violation of Section D.1.n of the TACP.

Charge 3

93. During the proceedings, Mr Dejanovic admitted to placing bets on tennis matches while being a Covered Person under the TACP. He acknowledged that he had engaged in wagering activities but contended that the bets were minor, involving small amounts

ranging from €1 to €20, and were placed on events in which he was not officiating. He argued that such minor betting should not warrant severe sanctions and emphasized that there was no evidence of him profiting significantly from these activities.

94. However, the TACP imposes a strict prohibition on any form of betting on tennis events by Covered Persons, regardless of the amount wagered or whether the matches were officiated by the individual. The rule is designed to maintain the integrity of the sport and to prevent any potential conflicts of interest or perceptions of impropriety.
95. Based on the admission by Mr Dejanovic and the evidence presented, the AHO finds that the ITIA has established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Mr Dejanovic violated Section D.1.a of the TACP by placing bets on tennis matches while being a Covered Person between 2022 and 2023.

I. Sanctions

96. The determination of appropriate sanctions under the Tennis Anti-Corruption Program (TACP) requires a careful approach to ensure that the penalties imposed are just, proportionate, and consistent with the objectives of deterring corrupt practices and upholding the integrity of tennis. To determine the sanction, the AHO may use the Sanctioning Guidelines developed by the Tennis Integrity Supervisory Board. Alternatively, reference may be made to the non-binding case law and general principles to determine the appropriate sanction. The ITIA referred to the Sanctioning Guidelines in its submissions, while Mr Dejanovic did not. The AHO has decided that for this case she will use the Sanctioning Guidelines as the basis for determining the sanctions.
97. The Guidelines provide that where there are multiple Corruption Offenses, in the interests of efficiency, they should be taken together in one concurrent sanctioning process – i.e., a single sanction in relation to the totality of offences should be imposed.
98. The ITIA has recommended a fine of \$10,000-15,000 and a ban of 5-7 years ineligibility. The AHO is not bound by the sanction recommended by the ITIA and may impose appropriate, just, and proportional sanctions pursuant to the TACP and the Guidelines bearing in mind all the circumstances of this case.

Application of the TACP 2021: Sanctioning Guidelines to the Facts of this Case

Step 1: Offense Category

99. The first step is to determine the offense category. This is accomplished by assessing culpability and then impact on the sport. The ITIA has submitted the offense category as B on culpability and the impact on the sport between at Category 1.
100. In terms of culpability, the manipulation of match scoring requires some level of planning. However, in this case, there is no direct evidence of extensive planning or coordination with others. An inference can be drawn however that there had to be some element of planning for Mr Dejanovic to know which games to target and intentionally input incorrect

scores into the PDA while audibly announcing the correct scores. Similarly there is no direct evidence of acting in concert with others. However the logical inference is that he manipulated the scores in the PDA to ensure that third parties could place bets accordingly. Lastly, Mr Dejanovic manipulated two matches within the same tournament. Therefore the AHO finds that the offense category is B is appropriate for his level of culpability

101. The other half of the first step is to determine the impact of the Covered Person's conduct on the sport. The AHO has assessed that the impact should sit between 1 and 2. The AHO has found Mr Dejanovic liable for two Major Offenses that took place within a single tournament. An inference may be drawn, even without evidence to this effect, that the Covered Person has been paid for entering incorrect scores in the PDA. Therefore, the AHO finds that material gain is established on a balance of probabilities. However given that some of the bets made on these matches were not significant, it is also possible to infer that the material gain was not relatively high or even significant, if any was received at all. The AHO agrees that the position of umpire is of utmost importance and should uphold the highest standards of integrity. Therefore the AHO finds that the impact level to fall between 1 and 2.

Step 2: Starting Point and Range

102. The Sanctioning Guidelines are not prescriptive. Having carefully considered all relevant matters, in particular the gravity of charges, the admitted charge, aggravating and mitigating factors, and the relevant precedents, a ban of four (4) years is the appropriate starting point.

Steps 3 and 4: Other Considerations for Sanctioning

103. Mr Dejanovic has admitted to betting on tennis matches, demonstrating some acceptance of responsibility in this matter, however contested the other two Major Offences related manipulation of scoring data and committing a corruption offense.

104. The AHO acknowledges that at the time of the offenses, Mr Dejanovic was young and relatively inexperienced in his role as a chair umpire having only officiated 20-30 matches over a two year period. It appears from the evidence that the amount of money involved in the offenses was minimal. There is no indication that Mr Dejanovic received substantial financial benefit from his actions. The AHO accepts that tennis officiating was not Mr Dejanovic's main source of income. He worked in construction to support himself financially. Mr Dejanovic also cooperated with the investigation and admitted to Charge 3 early on. Lastly, the AHO notes that there is no evidence of prior violations under the TACP or any other previous disciplinary issues.

105. Nevertheless, the AHO concludes that Mr Dejanovic's offenses are serious and warrant a sanction to uphold the integrity of tennis, these mitigating factors do not justify a reduction from the starting point. Therefore, the AHO finds a four year sanction appropriate in the circumstances.

Step 5: Fine

106. Aside from suspension, there is the issues of fines which are to be dealt with independently. Any fine should reflect the key aims of the TACP in reaching a reasonable and proportionate overall sanction which acts as an effective deterrent.
107. The AHO has considered Mr Dejanovic's personal financial circumstances and that there is no evidence of benefit having been received, and that he cooperated fully with the process. The AHO finds that a fine of 5,000 EUR is appropriate.
108. Given the Covered Person's alleged financial situation, a repayment plan is to be put in place, as offered by the ITIA. The AHO suggests quarterly installments of 500 EUR.
109. Based on the above findings, the AHO makes the following orders:

ORDERS

- (X) Damjan Dejanovic is a National level Umpire from Bosnia and Herzegovina and held a position as a Tournament Support Personnel defined in Section B.39 and consequently is a Covered Person as defined in Section B.10. of the TACP.
- (XI) The Covered Person is found to have committed Corruption Offences and breached on two counts Section D.1.m.i and two counts of Section D.1.n of TACP 2023. He further admitted to and is found to have breached on two counts Section D.1.a of the TACP 2022 and 2023 respectively.
- (XII) For these violations of the TACP the Covered Person is subject to a four (4) year period of ineligibility in any Sanctioned Event in accordance with Section H.1.b.iii.
- (XIII) The above ordered period of ineligibility is effective from the date the Covered Person was provisionally suspended, being 8 January 2024. The period of ineligibility shall end on 7 January 2028.
- (XIV) Under Section H.1.a.(i) a fine of 5,000 EUR is payable in quarterly instalments of 500 EUR.
- (XV) This Decision shall be publicly reported in full as prescribed in Section G.4.e.
- (XVI) Under Section G.4.d, this Decision is a "full, final and complete disposition of the matter and will be binding on all parties."
- (XVII) The Decision herein is appealable under Section I.1. of the 2021 TACP to the Court of Arbitration for Sport ("CAS") in Lausanne, Switzerland.
- (XVIII) Under Section I.4 of the TACP the deadline for filing an appeal with CAS must be made within a period of "twenty business days from the date of receipt of the decision by the appealing party."

Dated at Belgrade, Serbia this 20th day of November 2024

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read 'D. Tesic', is positioned above a horizontal line.

Diana Tesic, Anti-Corruption Hearing Officer